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Analysis of sequencing data for 143 blaNDM-1- and 
blaOXA-48-positive Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates 
from 13 European national collections and the public 
domain resulted in the identification of 15 previously 
undetected multi-country transmission clusters. For 
10 clusters, cases had prior travel/hospitalisation 
history in countries outside of the European Union 
including Egypt, Iran, Morocco, Russia, Serbia, Tunisia 
and Turkey. These findings highlight the benefit of 
European whole genome sequencing-based surveil-
lance and data sharing for control of antimicrobial 
resistance.
An alert regarding an outbreak of carbapenem-resist-
ant Klebsiella pneumoniae carrying bla NDM-1 and bla OXA-
48  carbapenemase-encoding genes was sent by 
Germany to European Union (EU)/European Economic 
Area (EEA) countries in October 2019 [1,2]. Since 
only limited whole genome sequencing (WGS) data 
on bla NDM-1- and bla OXA-48-positive K. pneumoniae were 
available in the public domain, national public health 
reference or equivalent expert laboratories from EU/
EEA countries were invited to share WGS data from 
their national collections with the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) to investigate 
the international dissemination of this epidemic 
strain. The analysis identified a Finnish case with an 
isolate closely related to the German outbreak strain 
and with an epidemiological link to St. Petersburg, 
Russia [1]. In addition, several other clusters of geneti-
cally related  bla  NDM-1- and  bla  OXA-48-positive  K. pneu-
moniae  unrelated to the German outbreak strain but 
affecting numerous EU/EEA countries were identified. 
The aim of this follow-up investigation was to 
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characterise these clusters based on the integrated 
analysis of the WGS dataset on  bla  NDM-1  -  and  bla  OXA-
48-positive  K. pneumoniae  submitted from 13 EU/EEA 
countries and additional epidemiological data.
Definitions and origin of samples and data
A case was defined as an individual with an isolate of K. 
pneumoniae  carrying both  bla  NDM-1  and  bla  OXA-48. An 
epidemiological link to a specific country was defined 
as either documented hospitalisation in or travel to this 
country within 6 months before isolation of the respec-
tive isolate. Samples and epidemiological information 
on bla NDM-1- and bla OXA-48-positive K. pneumoniae were 
provided by 13 EU/EEA countries by 5 December 2019: 
Belgium (n = 1), Denmark (n = 5), Finland (n = 2), France 
(n = 18), Germany (n = 39), Ireland (n = 1), Italy (n = 1), 
the Netherlands (n = 15), Norway (n = 1), Slovenia 
(n = 7), Spain (n = 3), Sweden (n = 8) and the UK (n = 16). 
Worldwide publicly available WGS data were retrieved 
from the National Centre for Biotechnology Information 
(NCBI) database on 23 November 2019. In total, WGS 
data from 143 isolates, i.e. 117 isolates from national 
collections and 26 publicly available isolates, were 
included in the analysis.
Figure 1
Maximum likelihood tree of bla NDM-1 - and bla OXA-48 -positive Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates based on single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms in whole genomes from EU/EEA national collections, 2014–2019 (n = 112), and genomes publicly available 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EEA: European Economic Area; EU: European Union; UK: United Kingdom.
Outer circle: clusters by colour code with white representing clusters/singletons that did not fulfil the cluster definition. The percentage 
bootstrap values are shown for each transmission cluster.
3www.eurosurveillance.org
Ethical statement
All data were anonymised and collected in accordance 
with the European Parliament and Council decisions on 
the epidemiological surveillance and control of com-
municable disease in the European Community. Ethical 
approval and informed consent were thus not required.
Whole genome sequencing analysis
Sequence data were processed as previously described 
[3]. The variants identified were used to create a pseu-
dochromosome using a custom script (https://figshare.
com/s/c7be54e5930e8b6a4103). The isolates were 
subjected to quality checks based on the highest pro-
portion of reads mapping to  K. pneumoniae  obtained 
in Kraken, on sequencing coverage depth (range: 
18–280×), on the number of heterozygous single nucle-
otide polymorphisms (SNP) which is indicative of con-
tamination within species, and on mapped reference 
coverage at 5× (> 90%). Pairwise distance between 
isolates was calculated using SNP-sites v2.4.0 and 
snp-dists v0.6.3. Clusters of related isolates were 
identified using hierarchical clustering (Ward.D2) of 50 
SNP. This more sensitive and less specific SNP thresh-
old was chosen in the absence of a standard thresh-
old acceptable for all  K. pneumoniae  sequence types 
(ST). A maximum likelihood tree was created using 
IQ-TREE with 1,000 bootstraps and a midpoint root 
based on SNP identified in 137 isolates over the entire 
chromosome. The maximum likelihood tree was visu-
alised using iTOL [4]. Multilocus sequence types were 
identified as previously described [3]. All strains were 
screened for the presence of antimicrobial resistance 
(AMR) genes using ARIBA with the Resfinder database 
[5] except for 12 isolates with long-read data that were 
analysed using Kleborate [6]. Sequence data for all iso-
lates have been submitted to the European Nucleotide 
Archive under study accession number PRJEB35890 [7].
Phylogenetic structure 
Of the 117 isolates from national collections, three were 
excluded as they did not fulfil the case definition and 
two additional isolates were excluded because they 
Figure 2
Resistome of Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates in clusters fulfilling the cluster definition (n = 56 isolates)
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EEA: European Economic Area; EU: European Union; UK: United Kingdom.
Including 48 genomes from national collections of EU/EEA countries, 2014–19, and 8 genomes accessed from the public domain available 
on 23 November 2019. Resistance genes that were positive in at least one isolate are shown on the x-axis, samples with place and year of 
isolation are presented on the y-axis. Clusters are highlighted in alternating colours. When the full exact amino acid match was not identified, 
the closest match was reported. Resistance genes for macrolides, chloramphenicol or rifampicin are not shown. MgrB genes were removed as 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Circular diagram of epidemiological information of Klebsiella pneumoniae cluster isolates provided by EU/EEA countries, 












































EEA: European Economic Area; EU: European Union; UK: United Kingdom.
Isolates from the public domain are not shown. Each line represents one case. The left part of the diagram (blue ring) shows the countries 
which reported cases and whole genome sequencing data. The right part of the graph shows the countries reported as places of previous 
hospitalisation or travel within the past six months before detection of the respective blaNDM-1- and blaOXA-48-positive K. pneumoniae isolate. 
Cases that were part of a reported national outbreak with likely patient-to-patient transmission were interpreted as transmission within the 
same country, unless there was available epidemiological information indicating cross-border spread.
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contained a large number of heterozygous SNP sites 
(n = 2,498–9,766) indicating possible contamination. 
Of the 26 publicly accessible genomes, 18 had meta-
data on location of origin. After analysing the quality 
control of the sequences, one genome was removed 
because of the large number of heterozygous SNP 
sites (n = 650). The overall phylogenetic structure of 
the K. pneumoniae  collection is presented in Figure 1. 
The resistome profiles were not entirely homogeneous 
within clusters, except for clusters 4, 12 and 15 (Figure 
2). 
Cross-border transmission
Cross-border transmission was reported if case iso-
lates from two or more countries were found to belong 
to the same specific genetic cluster, and only clusters 
with samples from at least two different countries are 
presented here. Fifteen clusters were identified that 
affected at least two countries, indicative of cross-bor-
der transmission. Ten of these clusters included recent 
isolates detected in 2018 or 2019. The size of the clus-
ters ranged from two to 13 samples, and involved up 
to three different countries (Table). Of the 13 EU/EEA 
countries submitting national data for this analysis, 
10 countries had at least one isolate in one of the 
cross-border clusters. For 10 clusters, epidemiologi-
cal data from the patient history suggested a possible 
link to a country outside the EU/EEA such as Egypt, 
Iran, Morocco, Russia, Serbia, Tunisia and Turkey 
(Table  and  Figure 3). However,  Figure 3  also indicates 
transmission of isolates between EU/EEA countries (1 
case) and within the same country (16 cases). 
Discussion
The cross-border transmission or introduction of mul-
tidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO) such as  bla  NDM-
1- and  bla  OXA-48  -positive  K. pneumoniae  revealed in 
this study is a threat to public health and may lead 
to further spread within the EU/EEA as documented 
by recent outbreaks [1,8,9]. Our findings highlight the 
importance of including prior hospitalisation or recent 
travel to areas with a high prevalence MDRO as a risk 
a factor for hospital admission screening. Failing to 
detect carriage of MDRO may not only be detrimental 
for the individual patient, but also increases the like-
lihood of undetected transmission in the healthcare 
setting.
The available epidemiological information suggested 
several possible countries of origin for the described 
transmission clusters. However, the data collection was 
restricted to countries with the national capacity and 
funding to generate WGS data. Unfortunately, epide-
miological evidence for a link with a non-EU/EEA coun-
try could not be substantiated by WGS results because 
WGS data from the potential countries of origin were not 
available. The evidence that epidemiologically linked 
countries were the sources for the respective isolates 
is therefore inconclusive. However, the hypothesis 
of potential countries of origin including Egypt, Iran, 
Morocco, Russia, Tunisia and Turkey is supported by 
the reported occurrence of bla NDM-1- and bla OXA-48 -posi-
tive K. pneumoniae in those countries [10-15].
Currently established European AMR surveillance sys-
tems did not detect these multinational clusters. This 
study highlights the benefit of international collabo-
ration and data sharing as these clusters were only 
identified by pooling of WGS data from 13 national col-
lections. Development of WGS-based surveillance is 
under way with the European Antimicrobial Resistance 
Genes Surveillance Network (EURGen-Net), but is not 
yet established. The EU/EEA countries that do not 
perform WGS for AMR control [16,17], lack the infor-
mation to elucidate cross-border transmission routes. 
Consequently, the identified transmission clusters may 
involve many more countries than described here. In 
addition to data sharing as part of EU-wide outbreak 
investigations, archiving of WGS data in the public 
domain provides epidemiological context for interpret-
ing local and national data and enhances the identi-
fication of the putative sources of an outbreak with a 
wider benefit for AMR control.
The repeated cross-border spread of MDRO challenges 
the control of AMR in the EU/EEA including in countries 
with good detection capacity, vigorous infection pre-
vention and control (IPC) measures and good antibiotic 
stewardship practices. Detection requires adequate 
clinical laboratory capacity to detect carbapenemase-
producing Enterobacterales, sufficient WGS capacity in 
all EU/EEA countries to characterise the isolates and 
secure mechanisms for rapid sharing of WGS data at 
European and international level. Control requires suf-
ficient resources for the implementation of IPC meas-
ures and cooperation with and provision of support in 
all these areas to countries neighbouring the EU/EEA 
as well as worldwide.
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